Flight Sergeant John Allen Howell

Allen’s first recorded flight with No. 12 Squadron was not a bombing mission. It was a movement flight, ferrying the aircraft from Landing Ground 21 to Advanced Landing Ground 140.

These movements were part of the rhythm of desert air operations. Squadrons operated from temporary landing grounds and shifted aircraft as the front moved or as operational needs changed.

The entry places Allen close to the front before his first recorded combat sortie two days later.

This was Allen’s first recorded operational sortie. After training in Canada, further movement through Britain, and arrival in Egypt, he was now flying in combat over North Africa.

The crew attacked Derna from medium altitude. The log records that anti-aircraft fire was very accurate, meaning the aircraft came under effective ground fire during the operation.

The bombs were released, but no results were observed. That does not necessarily mean the attack failed. It means the crew could not confirm damage before leaving the target area.

Allen’s second operational sortie was flown in direct support of Allied ground forces. The target was a concentration of enemy motor transport and tanks, meaning trucks, vehicles, and armoured forces near the battlefield.

The log notes that Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters attacked the escort. This suggests the bomber formation was being protected by Allied fighters and that the air battle unfolded around the bombers as they carried out their mission.

The short follow-up flight later that day repositioned the aircraft again, showing how frequently crews and aircraft moved between desert landing grounds.

Allen’s third operational sortie returned the crew to the Derna area. The aircraft again carried a mixed bomb load and carried out a medium-level attack.

This time the anti-aircraft fire was described as light, but cloud and darkness made it difficult to observe the results. The logbook’s brief note, “very cloudy and too dark,” shows how limited visibility could prevent crews from knowing what their bombing had achieved.

A later movement flight returned the aircraft from Advanced Landing Ground 140 to Landing Ground 21.

This was a short local training flight rather than an operational sortie. The duty entry “W/T – A/G” refers to wireless telegraphy and air gunnery, the two parts of Allen’s trade as a Wireless Air Gunner.

The crew flew from base to Qasaba and returned, allowing Allen and the crew to practise communications, gunnery-related duties, and crew coordination while remaining near the squadron’s operating area.

Even after operational flying had begun, training and practice flights remained part of the squadron’s routine.

Before returning to combat operations, Allen and Greindl spent several flights moving aircraft between temporary desert landing grounds.

These movements show how different the desert air war was from service at a permanent station. Aircraft were shifted between rough landing grounds as the front moved, operational range changed, or the squadron needed to reduce exposure.

This sequence placed Allen and the crew in position for a heavy day of close-support flying on 15 June.

Allen flew two completed close-support missions in one afternoon, both directed against enemy vehicles and armour near the battlefield.

Close-support work placed medium bombers in direct relationship with the ground war. The crew was not attacking a distant strategic target. They were bombing trucks, tanks, and other vehicles connected to the fighting around Acroma and El Adem.

The same day also included two recalled missions. In the Western Desert, the situation could change quickly. Targets moved, intelligence changed, weather shifted, or friendly troops advanced or withdrew before aircraft reached the target area.

Allen completed two operational sorties on 16 June, again in support of Allied ground forces. The targets were concentrations of enemy motor transport and tanks.

During the second sortie, the formation was attacked five times by German Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters and Italian Macchi C.200 fighters. The logbook does not describe the attack in emotional terms, but the entry shows that the crew was operating in contested airspace.

The note “fires started” indicates that the crew or formation observed fires in the target area after the attack, suggesting visible results from the bombing.

On 17 June, Allen’s crew flew three army co-operation raids in a single day. The targets were again enemy motor transport and tanks, including vehicles moving north-west south-east of El Adem.

The log records one large fire on the second raid and two fires on the third. These observations suggest the crew or formation saw visible effects in the target area.

The final short flight of the day was not a raid. It moved the aircraft from the advanced landing ground to a satellite landing ground as the forward position was being evacuated.

This short flight was part of an evacuation. The logbook notes that enemy forces were only three miles away from the satellite landing ground.

The wording is brief, but the implication is clear: the squadron was moving because the battlefield had shifted dangerously close. Aircraft, crews, and ground personnel had to withdraw before the landing ground became untenable.

This entry places Allen’s air war directly inside the movement of the ground campaign. No. 12 Squadron was not watching events from a safe distance. Its landing grounds were part of the retreating and shifting desert front.

Allen flew two significant missions during one of the most important turning points of the North African Campaign. The first attacked enemy troops south-west of Tobruk, where numerous fires were observed after the bombing.

The following evening the crew attacked traffic moving along the Tobruk–Bardia road. Incendiary bombs were dropped against enemy transport before Lieutenant Greindl descended to strafe vehicles along the road for nearly ten miles.

While these sorties were being flown, Tobruk fell to Axis forces on 21 June 1942. Its capture marked one of the British Eighth Army’s greatest defeats of the campaign and triggered a rapid Allied withdrawal eastward toward Egypt. Allen’s logbook captures the squadron continuing to attack the advancing Axis forces throughout the retreat.

Only two days after the fall of Tobruk, Allen’s crew evacuated Landing Ground 7 as Allied air units continued withdrawing toward Egypt.

These short relocation flights rarely receive much attention in operational histories, yet they were essential to keeping No. 12 Squadron in action. Aircraft, crews, maintenance personnel, fuel, ammunition, and equipment all had to be moved before advancing Axis forces reached the landing grounds.

The movement back to Landing Ground 21 reflects the increasingly fluid nature of the desert campaign during late June 1942.

Over three consecutive days Allen completed five operational sorties in support of the British Eighth Army as it continued withdrawing toward El Alamein.

The missions focused almost entirely on enemy columns of motor transport, tanks and troop concentrations. Rather than attacking fixed installations, the squadron attempted to slow the Axis advance by striking vehicles moving along desert roads.

During Sortie 17 the formation was intercepted by six enemy fighters. Allen recorded that one attacking aircraft was shot down by the formation while another was destroyed by the escort. His final remark, “guns U.S.”, indicates that his own defensive guns remained serviceable throughout the engagement.

As the front continued moving east, No. 12 Squadron again shifted its operating locations. Allen’s log records movements to Landing Ground 97 before another relocation from Bilbeis to Landing Ground 98.

Although these flights were not operational sorties, they demonstrate how quickly the squadron adapted to the changing battlefield. Aircraft rarely remained at one landing ground for long during this phase of the campaign.

During the opening days of July, Allen flew nine missions as the fighting shifted to the approaches of El Alamein. The logbook records repeated attacks against enemy motor transport, tanks and retreating columns while Allied forces attempted to establish a defensive line across northern Egypt.

The entries reveal increasingly intense opposition. Several sorties encountered heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire, while others were intercepted by Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters. One formation leader was shot down, although Allen recorded that the crew survived, while other aircraft returned with battle damage.

Among the combat sorties is a communications flight on 9 July, when Allen helped transport mail between Landing Ground 97 and Bilbeis. Even during the height of the campaign, routine logistical flights remained an important part of keeping the squadron operating.

Allen returned to combat operations on 11 July, attacking enemy concentrations south-west of El Alamein as Allied forces attempted to halt the Axis advance.

The log records that German Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers, escorted by fighters, were simultaneously attacking Allied ground forces while No. 12 Squadron carried out its own bombing mission. The entry captures the intensity of the air battle developing over the El Alamein front.

The following day Allen flew aboard a Martin Maryland aircraft on a communications flight carrying General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East. Although the purpose of the journey is not recorded, the flight illustrates how operational aircraft were occasionally tasked with transporting senior commanders between headquarters and forward areas.

Both sorties continued the pattern established during July: repeated attacks against enemy vehicles supporting the Axis advance toward El Alamein.

Allen noted that bombs straddled enemy lorries during Sortie 28, indicating that the bomb pattern fell across the target column. The following day the crew attacked enemy tanks and vehicles near El Mreir, observing fires after the bombing despite anti-aircraft fire.

These entries reflect the increasing emphasis on disrupting enemy supply columns rather than attacking fixed installations. Every destroyed vehicle reduced the Axis Army’s ability to maintain its offensive.

This was one of the largest and most successful operations recorded in Allen’s flying log.

No. 12 Squadron participated in a major coordinated attack against an Axis landing ground using a large mixed force of bombers and fighter escorts. Allen recorded that twenty-eight aircraft were destroyed on the ground, while Allied fighter escorts shot down five additional enemy aircraft, including four Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft and one Junkers Ju 87 Stuka.

The scale of the operation illustrates how Allied air power was beginning to shift from reacting to the Axis advance toward systematically attacking enemy air assets and supply infrastructure.

Over two days Allen completed five operational sorties, reflecting the relentless tempo of air operations during the First Battle of El Alamein.

The missions attacked enemy troop concentrations, tanks and transport columns while also carrying out precision bombing against selected targets. Allen repeatedly noted light or moderate anti-aircraft fire, while the final sortie recorded that the bombing had been effective.

By late July, Allen and his crew had become experienced operational airmen. The concise language of the logbook contrasts with the intensity of the flying, as multiple bombing missions were routinely completed within a single day.

Allen’s thirty-sixth operational sortie again targeted an Axis landing ground, demonstrating the growing Allied effort to reduce enemy air power over the El Alamein battlefield.

The mission encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire before enemy fighters engaged the formation. Allen also recorded that Lieutenant Coleman was shot down during the operation while Allied fighter escorts defended the bomber force.

Although only briefly described in the logbook, the entry reflects the increasing risks faced by bomber crews as both sides concentrated large numbers of aircraft over the narrow El Alamein front.

Allen’s thirty-seventh operational sortie marked a change in emphasis from attacking mobile battlefield targets to striking Axis infrastructure at Mersa Matruh.

The use of delayed-action fuses suggests the bombs were intended to continue posing a hazard after impact, slowing repairs and disrupting activity within the harbour and military installations. Flying at night reduced the risk of fighter interception but exposed the bomber force to searchlights and concentrated anti-aircraft fire around the target.

The operation demonstrates the squadron’s expanding role as Allied air power increasingly targeted supply centres supporting Axis operations along the Egyptian coast.

This flight tested radio direction-finding equipment rather than carrying out an operational bombing mission. Reliable wireless communication and navigation were essential in the featureless desert, where landmarks were limited and aircraft often operated over long distances.

As a Wireless Air Gunner, Allen’s responsibilities extended well beyond manning the aircraft’s defensive guns. He was also responsible for maintaining radio communications, assisting with navigation, and ensuring the crew remained in contact with other aircraft and ground stations throughout the flight.

This sortie became one of the most significant entries in Allen’s flying log, not because of the target, but because of the losses recorded at its conclusion.

While attacking enemy troop and vehicle concentrations south-west of El Alamein, the formation encountered heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire together with enemy fighters. At the end of the entry, Allen simply noted, “Lt Luke crashed. Lt Greene killed.“

Although the logbook provides no further detail, these brief words record the loss of fellow aircrew serving alongside No. 12 Squadron. Family recollections suggest that witnessing these events had a lasting impact on Allen and may have contributed to the end of his operational flying only weeks later.

Allen’s thirty-ninth operational sortie returned the squadron to Mersa Matruh under cover of darkness. The objective was the stores and jetty facilities supporting Axis operations.

The crew dropped incendiary bombs and observed two fires after the attack. Allen recorded that the aircraft encountered intense anti-aircraft fire together with six searchlights attempting to illuminate the bomber during its bombing run.

This would prove to be Allen’s final operational bombing mission before leaving the squadron’s flying programme. His next entries record leave and, finally, one last sortie later in August.

After nearly three months of continuous operational flying, Allen’s log records a short flight from Landing Ground 99 to Bilbeis to begin nine days’ leave.

Periods of leave were an important part of maintaining the effectiveness of operational aircrew. Since joining No. 12 Squadron on 30 May 1942, Allen had participated in thirty-nine operational sorties, numerous aircraft movements, communications exercises, and support flights while living and operating from temporary desert landing grounds under demanding conditions.

Although the logbook simply notes “9 Days Leave,” the break came after one of the most intense periods of the North African Campaign. Within days, Allen would return to the squadron for what would become his final operational mission.

Following nine days’ leave, Allen returned to operational flying for what would become the final combat sortie recorded in his flying log. Before reaching the target area, the crew was intercepted by two German Messerschmitt fighters. Lieutenant Greindl successfully took evasive action by climbing into cloud, although the aircraft was struck fourteen times by enemy fire.

The mission continued despite the damage. Flying at extremely low level, the crew attacked enemy camps and the aerodrome at Fuka, carrying out strafing runs from an altitude of approximately thirty feet before releasing incendiary bombs. Allen recorded that the aircraft encountered very intense anti-aircraft fire, including fire from Allied positions, illustrating the hazards faced by bomber crews operating at night near the front line.

Rather than returning to its original landing ground, the damaged aircraft diverted to Idku on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, where the crew landed safely. The following day they flew the short distance back to Landing Ground 99, bringing Allen’s operational flying with No. 12 Squadron to a close.

Between 2 June and 23 August 1942, Allen’s log records 40 operational sorties, together with numerous aircraft movements, communications flights and training exercises. In less than three months he flew against enemy airfields, troop concentrations, tanks, motor transport, supply installations and harbour facilities while supporting the British Eighth Army through the retreat from Gazala, the fall of Tobruk and the First Battle of El Alamein.

This is the final entry in Allen’s wartime flying log. Although he remained attached to No. 12 Squadron until November 1942, no further operational flights were recorded. His surviving records suggest that the events of August 1942, together with illness and the cumulative strain of sustained combat operations, marked the end of his flying career in the North African Campaign.